Tag Archives: 山本五十六

The Truly Reluctant Admiral Yamamoto – Part IX


End of a Samurai Son’s Life

Remains of Admiral Yamamoto’s plane. – USAF

After radio chatter in supposed secret Japanese naval code was intercepted by MAGIC on April 13, 1943, the US Navy jumped into action.  The US Navy brass now knew of Yamamoto’s projected flight schedule just five days later.

But to fully appreciate this, of course, it is critical to note this was 1943 and during a most vile world war.  There was no faxing, texting, internet or the like.  Also, Yamamoto’s plane may not start that day, weather may alter the flight or he may  just get sick (He did suffer from a form of beriberi.).

But some huge questions that had to be answered in only three days if the shoot-down were to occur successfully:

  1. Who was going to order/approve the killing?
  2. How was it going to get carried out? And,
  3. How can the Japanese be kept from figuring out our secret that we broke their secret code? (1)

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Adm. Nimitz

Sources differ on who approved the go-ahead for Admiral Yamamoto’s killing.

Some sources say Admiral Nimitz said go.

Some sources say Admiral Nimitz refused to give the order to kill Admiral Yamamoto and deferred the decision to his superior, Admiral King.

Some sources say no military brass wanted to approve the killing and that it ultimately came from FDR (which by definition becomes an assassination).  Although no document from that time could be found, several items indicate FDR was at least involved. (1) (2)

But one thing is certain; when Bull Halsey found out the mission was a go, he stated, “TALLY HO X LET’S GET THE BASTARD.”

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Some buried history on the actual mission to kill Admiral Yamamoto:

  1. In a tent choked with humidity on Guadalcanal’s Henderson Field on April 17, 1943, Admiral Marc Mitscher read the message marked ‘TOP SECRET’, signed by the Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox. In attendance was Major John W. Mitchell, USAAF.  He would plan and lead the flight:
    “SQUADRON 339 P-38 MUST AT ALL COSTS REACH AND DESTROY. PRESIDENT ATTACHES EXTREME IMPORTANCE TO MISSION.”
  2. The recently deployed P-38G Lightning was the only fighter that could accomplish the shoot-down.  Other fighters like the US Navy’s Grumman F4F or new Vought F4U Corsair simply could not fly the approximately 800 mile round trip.  Even then, without Charles Lindbergh’s engineering insights to lean-burn, the flight may have been impossible for the P-38Gs. Still, the P-38s required external fuel tanks, one of which must be a 330 gallon capacity, the other 150.  They were located at Port Moresby, expedited to Guadalcanal then hurriedly attached to the fighters in an all night effort.
  3. A Marine named Major John Condon actually drafted up the flight plan first but Major Mitchell rejected it with only 12 hours of so before takeoff.  With input from several key pilots, Mitchell rushedly planned out the mission as the shootdown was to occur the next day with the flight leaving early in the morning! Relying on Yamamoto’s trademark punctuality, Mitchell precisely “walked back” the flight path from the expected intercept time over the southwest coast of Bougainville at 9:35 AM.

    Source: U. S. Naval Institute.

4. It was determined there would be four “killer” attack planes and 14 escort planes to handle the anticipated six Zero escort fighters and to compensate for aborts.  The 14 escort fighters were also in anticipation of the dozens of other land-based Zero fighters that may be airborne.  The four killer planes were responsible for the single Betty bomber carrying Admiral Yamamoto. (3)

5. Mitchell, in leading the flight, demanded the standard USAAF compass on his P-38G be replaced by a larger and more accurate Navy compass.  “Dead reckoning” would be the order of the day and exact headings were an absolute requirement – therefore, the need for the most accurate compass available.  All they would see in their 400 mile flight out would be water. 

In spite of all my research attempts, this may be the “Navy” compass that Mitchell ordered installed on his P-38G Lightning. It afforded more accuracy than the standard compass on his stock instrument panel (below).
A possible image of a P-38G instrument panel. The standard compass is at “3”.

6. One P-38 suffered a flat tire at takeoff and another’s fuel transfer from belly tanks failed, leaving 12 escort P-38s for the anticipated combat.  Surprisingly, these two planes that dropped out due to the mechanical failures were two of the four original killer planes.

7. Per a recent Military Intelligence Service’s veteran’s report, “At 7:25 AM on April 18 1943, the American pilots departed
Henderson Field, Guadalcanal, to travel a circuitous all water route at ten to thirty feet above the water and radio silenced to avoid enemy radar detection.  At 8:00 AM, 35 minutes later and 700 miles away, Yamamoto’s convoy took off on schedule from Rabaul airfield and (then) arrived over the southwest coast of Bougainville at 9:35 AM, the exact time the P 38s arrived there.”(2) The flight path avoided all possibility of being seen from occupied islands or radar.  Being literally at sea level, it was sweltering in the cockpit.  Mitchell had to fight of drowsiness as one mistake meant death an instant later.

8. Miraculously, Mitchell had guided his attack force to within one minute of the targeted arrival time.  The third pilot spotted the flight but it included TWO Betty bombers, not the single one dictated in the decoded secret message.  At this moment, Mitchell was not sure if this was Yamamoto’s flight. Forunately, Mitchell made the snap decision to attack, said, “Skin them (meaning drop fuel tanks),” and began combat.

9. Lanphier and Barber both had hits on the Betty bomber that carried Admiral Yamamoto.  However, Lanphier’s gun camera footage shows his rounds striking the Betty bomber, causing part of the left wing to split off.  The bomber then crashed into the jungle.

Here is footage from both American and Japanese viewpoints (scroll to the 5:28 mark).  It does show in slow motion Lanphier’s gun camera footage where he shoots off part of the left wing of Yamamoto’s plane. (Important note: the “gunfire” you hear in the actual gun footage is edited in.  The gun cameras were silent B&W film.)

10. One killer P-38 piloted by Lt. Raymond K. Hine was lost; he originally began the flight as an escort fighter but moved up when the two killer planes had to abort. There were various sightings from Japanese reports which claim his supercharger was hit and engine smoking when he headed out to sea.  He was never heard from or seen again.  In spite of claims by the USAAF pilots, not one Zero was shot down although several were damaged.

11. The six Japanese Zero pilots assigned to escort Admiral Yamamoto were:

Photos of the six Imperial Japanese Navy pilots assigned to protect Admiral Yamamoto. Only Yanagiya (bottom left) survived the war albeit severely wounded. Source unknown.

All were shamed, of course, for failing in their duty to protect Admiral Yamamoto but they were up against tremendous odds.  Japanese brass decided not to have them commit suicide; the brass knew they would perish in combat in their hopes Yamamoto’s death woukd be kept underwraps.  Sure enough, all but Kenji Yanagiya would be killed in action within a short period.  Yanagiya was severely wounded, losing his right hand and was sent home.  He passed away in 2008 at the age of 88.

A young Kenji Yanagiya. He was the only one to survive the war from the six Zero pilots assigned to protect Admiral Yamamoto. Source unknown.
Yanagiya shortly before his passing.

12. Per John Connor, History.net, he writes:

“At every stage, planners had stressed the need for secrecy. But even before the P-38s had landed, security was compromised.

As the returning planes neared Guadalcanal, Lanphier radioed to the control tower: “That son of a bitch will not be dictating any peace terms in the White House.” Lanphier’s announcement was shocking to others on the mission. Air-to-ground messages were broadcast in the clear, and the Japanese monitored American aviation frequencies. Lanphier’s message left little to the imagination. Bystanders on Guadalcanal, including a young navy officer named John F. Kennedy, watched as Lanphier executed a victory roll over the field before landing. “I got him!” Lanphier announced to the crowd after climbing out of his cockpit. “I got that son of a bitch. I got Yamamoto.”

Halsey and Nimitz, when they found out, went nuts as if the Japanese heard the message, they would realize that Lanphier knew Yamamoto was on board which would be impossible unless we broke their JN-25 naval code.

13. Behind the scenes, President Franklin D. Roosevelt reacted with glee, writing a mock letter of condolence to Yamamoto’s widow that circulated around the White House but was never sent:

Dear Widow Yamamoto:

Time is a great leveler and somehow I never expected to see the old boy at the White House anyway. Sorry I can’t attend the funeral because I approve of it.

Hoping he is where we know he ain’t.

Very sincerely yours,

/s/ Franklin D. Roosevelt

14. The US definitely wanted to keep the Japanese Navy from suspecting we had broken their JN-25 code.  In a ploy to make it look like Mitchell’s flight was indeed a chance of luck, the USAAF sent out similar patrols on subsequent days.  Besides, the Japanese did NOT publicize his death for about two months; as such, the Americans could not possibly know Admiral Yamamoto was killed.

15. Decades later, the feud between Barber and Lanphier continued as to who shot Yamamoto down.  At the end, the US Navy officially awarded the “kill” to Barber.  When that happened, ironically, Lanphier lost his “ace” status.

Mission crew. Source unknown.
Barber on left, Lanphier on right.

16. Per the Japanese Navy’s coroner’s report, Yamamoto was found ejected from the crashed plane but still strapped into the pilot’s seat.  Further, that he was still clutching his family’s samurai sword.  The report stated that the seat was upright resting against a tree and that his face looked unchanged.  It further stated the cause of death was from two .50 caliber rounds, one into his back and another entering though his jaw and exiting above the right eye.  (Author’s note: I am highly suspect of this report given it was from propaganda driven wartime Japan.  Although I never served, I cannot fathom his face “looking unchanged” when a .50 caliber round exited above his right eye after entering through his jaw. I also cannot believe he was still clutching his samurai sword after being ejected from the plane.)

17. The second Betty bomber carried Yamamoto’s Chief of Staff Vice Admiral Matome Ugaki.  He and two other sailors survived the crash into the ocean after being shot down albeit with a broken arm.  He would recover from his wounds but would not return from the infamous last kamikaze attack  of WWII which he led on August 15, 1945.  He did not make his target.  He would leave behind his meticulous diary, a wealth of information.

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More to follow in Part X.

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Footnotes:

(1) It was vital that the Japanese not know their naval codes (the JN-25) had been broken.  If they did, they would react and modify their code.  This would terminate the US Navy’s ability to track and sink military and most of all, merchant shipping of vital natural resources taken from captured countries.  As written in “What Did FDR Know”, the sinking of many tons of merchant vessels was made possible by our breaking their JN-25.

(2) “…The message was decrypted and translated at FRUPAC by Marine Lt Col Alva Byan Lasswell and was passed the next day to
Commander Ed Layton, CINCPAC intelligence officer.  Admiral Chester NIMITZ, CINCPAC, sent the message to Washington. President Franklin Roosevelt approved and requested the
shoot down of Admiral Yamamoto’s air convoy be given the highest priority. This was conveyed to RADM Marc A. Mitscher, commander of the Solomons region, via NIMITZ and Admiral Halsey who was responsible for that region.”  – “Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto Air Convoy Shoot Down” report, JAVA, April 18, 2014. The author was a noted Military Intelligence Service member during WWII.

(3) The original flight organization was:

Initial Killer Flight:

Capt. Thomas G. Lanphier, Jr.

Lt. Rex T. Barber

Lt. Jim McLanahan (dropped out with flat tire)

Lt. Joe Moore (dropped out with faulty fuel feed)

The remaining pilots were to as reserves and provide air cover against any retaliatory attacks by local Japanese fighters:

Maj. John Mitchell (In command)

Lt. William Smith

Lt. Gordon Whittiker

Lt. Roger Ames

Capt. Louis Kittel

Lt. Lawrence Graebner

Lt. Doug Canning

Lt. Delton Goerke

Lt. Julius Jacobson

Lt. Eldon Stratton

Lt. Albert Long

Lt. Everett Anglin

Lt. Besby F. Holmes (replaced McLanahan)

Lt. Raymond K. Hine (replaced Moore and KIA)

 

The Truly Reluctant Admiral Yamamoto – Part VIII


Artist’s rendition of Admiral Yamamoto’s shootdown by Grinnell.

Admiral Yamamoto’s Death

Back during the day, there had been a great brouhaha over the killing of Admiral Yamamoto on April 18, 1943.  Two USAAF pilots bickered for decades after the war as to who shot Admiral Yamamoto out of the sky.  While most attribute the killing to a pilot named Lt. Rex Barber, others believe Capt. Thomas Lanphier Jr. fired the fatal burst from his Lockheed P-38G Lightning.

My photo of the crashsite depiction at Chino’s Planes of Fame Air Museum.

We will never truly know.

But some lost history first on what led to Admiral Yamamoto’s killing.

The Most Hated Man in America – Even More Than Hitler

By April 1943, Admiral Yamamoto was the most hated man in America by many accounts – more so than Hitler.  Think of it this way.  Yamamoto was WWII’s version of today’s Osama bin Laden (or however you wish to spell it) on a hate level.

How did it come to be?

Sure, there are Pearl Harbor parallels with bin Laden; bin Laden masterminded the surprise “dastardly” attack on 9/11 on American civilians.  (Dastardly. Sound familiar?) The attackers were maniacal terrorists who definitely knew it would be a one-way trip and it was to appease their god… but they didn’t fly their own planes to attack America.

But in my opinion, that’s where the parallels lack some merit if not wrong in substance.  For one, Yamamoto as you learned was AGAINST taking on America as an enemy unlike bin Laden.  It would be the end of the Japanese empire and he was right.  Secondly, the surprise Pearl Harbor attack was against military targets using their own planes. Thirdly, while the attacking navy pilots could die for their emperor on this mission, it was not their desired outcome. They did not see this for the most part as a one-way trip.

Sure, it is enough to hate Yamamoto on the surface but how did he become by and large the most hated man in America?  It was because of… fake news.

Yes, fake news.  Things manipulated or taken out of context.

And it started with the Japanese.

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Before the strike on Pearl Harbor and with plans generally in place, Admiral Yamamoto wrote to his close friend, Ryoichi Sasakawa:

“Should hostilities once break out between Japan and the United States, it is not enough that we take Guam and the Philippines, nor even Hawaii and San Francisco. To make victory certain, we would have to march into Washington and dictate the terms of peace in the White House. I wonder if our politicians, among whom armchair arguments about war are being glibly bandied about in the name of state politics, have confidence as to the final outcome and are prepared to make the necessary sacrifices. (1)”

Time magazine cover, December 22, 1941.

Well, a bit after the attack on Pearl, the Japanese propaganda machine went into action.  For the most part, folks, the Japanese propaganda/news media would GREATLY exaggerate  if not lie to present the rosiest war picture to boost the morale of the citizens.  In this case, the contents of Yamamoto’s private letter got “leaked” (sound familiar?) but the militarists dropped his last sentence of what he wrote in its entirely – which therefore shed a whole different tone on what was he truly meant (in bold italics above).

Then, the American propaganda machine took over.  They picked up what Yamamoto supposedly said and changed its meaning even more. Posters sprang up all over the place with purposely and understandably exaggerated caricatures demonizing Yamamoto… but most of all, very much mutating the questioning feelings of Yamamoto.  Time Magazine even took part.

Please don’t misunderstand the gist of what I am writing here.  These are facts.

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The Killing

The shoot down of Yamamoto in a moving airborne target 76 years ago was a miracle by today’s standards.  Likely, it was mostly luck after the U.S. attack force took off.  Today, drones can be sent in with Hellfire missiles with GPS accuracy when a message intercepted.

But in a very primitive way now, that’s how the U.S. killed Yamamoto, the mastermind of the Pearl Harbor sneak attack.

It was Lady Luck.

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In April 1943, Guadalcanal was a dismal place for Japanese soldiers. Through blunders, bad intelligence and exaggerated aerial combat reports, Japanese soldiers had minimal war materials for combat or were simply dying of starvation or illness.  It guesstimated that these young boys were trying to fight on less than 1,700 calories a day without such energy staples as rice or potatoes.

Yamamoto was tasked to resupply them by sea but was thwarted by the US Navy and USAAF as we had broken their naval code.  They had resorted to using their samurai swords to dig dirt looking for food.

Ballale Island where Yamamoto was headed; he never made it.
Ballale today; largely uninhabited.

Knowing their dismal state and morale, their consummate leader Yamamoto made the fatal decision to go down to the front lines to boost morale.  This would have been akin to Ike visiting the freezing soldiers during the horrendous winter at Bastogne.  His initial stop was to have been the naval base Ballale, an active airfield for the Japanese Imperial Navy pilots. His lieutenants strongly urged him not to go but his character gave Yamamoto no other avenue.  The plans were made then dispatched by radio.

Source: U. S. Naval Institute.

The Japanese held islands lit up the airwaves with radio chatter on April 13, 1943.  The chatter reported their great revered leader Yamamoto was coming down to cheer on the troops.  The chatter included his detailed flight schedule as well as he and his second in command Admiral Ugaki would be flying in a Betty bomber escorted by six Japanese Zeroes.  Admiral Yamamoto was always punctual – and that would help get him killed.

Well, the radio chatter was in what the Japanese thought was their secret Imperial Japanese Navy Code JN-25D. (3) They believed that “Westerners” could not break it.  Well, it was a very closely guarded secret but the US had broken the code by the Battle of Midway.  From what I read, the actual JN-25D coded message announcing Yamamoto’s upcoming visit said (translated into English):

“ON APRIL 18 CINC COMBINED FLEET WILL VISIT RXZ,R–, AND RXP IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING SCHEDULE:

1. DEPART RR AT 0600 IN A MEDIUM ATTACK PLANE ESCORTED BY 6 FIGHTERS. ARRIVE RXZ AT 0800. IMMEDIATELY DEPART FOR R- ON BOARD SUBCHASER (1ST BASE FORCE TO READY ONE BOAT), ARRIVING AT 0840. DEPART R- 0945 ABOARD SAID SUBCHASER, ARRIVING RXZ AT 1030. (FOR TRANSPORTATION PURPOSES, HAVE READY AN ASSAULT BOAT AT R- AND A MOTOR LAUNCH AT RXZ.) 1100 DEPARTRXZ ON BOARD MEDIUM ATTACK PLANE, ARRIVING RXP AT 1110. LUNCH AT 1 BASE FORCE HEADQUARTERS (SENIOR STAFF OFFICER OF AIR FLOTILLA 26 TO BE PRESENT). 1400 DEPART RXP ABOARD MEDIUM ATTACK PLANE; ARRIVE RR AT 1540. (2)

(Note: the bolded italics is the portion that pertains to the shootdown.  The rest of the decoded message relates to Yamamoto’s schedule AFTER he touches down.  US command at Kukum Field decided going for the subchasers would be questionable as the USAAF pilots wouldn’t be able to discern surface ship configurations but they knew aircraft.)

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Details of the shootdown, the aftermath and the secrets – from both sides of the Pacific – comes in Part IX.

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Footnotes:

(1) “At Dawn We Slept,” (1981) by Gordon W. Prange.  Page 11.

(2) – Source: US Naval Institute.  Also, the original coded message was in Japanese; it was translated into English by US Army Niseis in the Military Intelligence Service (my Dad’s old unit).

(3) Aiding the effort to completely crack the secret Japanese naval code were two military action events.  First, a few days after the US Marines invaded Guadalcanal on August 7, 1942, the Marines capture a complete JN-25C code book.

Then in February 1943, US recovers significant code materials from the I-1 beached off Guadalcanal after a fierce surface battle with two British minesweepers.  The captured documents included a superceded JN-25 code book, but no additive book.  “As part of the crew at Station AL Guadalcanal, (he) helped rehabilitate the five code books recovered plus many other classified documents and navigational charts. They were sent by courier to Pearl Harbor.”  The report continued:

“…The salt-water logged code books retrieved by the Ortolan were taken to Station AL (a small intercept, direction finder, traffic analysis, cryptoanalysis and reporting station on Guadalcanal). There they were dried by being placed on top of a radio receiver to use its heat.  The records were kept for about two days to get them in shape for transport.  They were taken to the intercept site at Lunga Point, a promontory on the northern coast of Guadalcanal. From there they were sent to CINCPAC’s code breakers at Pearl Harbor.

While the code breakers were trying to exploit the captured code material from the I-1, translators began the task of translating and publishing important documents from the submarine. The U. S. Army Forces in the South Pacific Area (USAFISPA) begins publishing I-1 items in early March. On March 1, the Translation and Interrogation Section, G-2 (my Dad’s unit), of the USAFISPA published a notebook containing entries for January 1-29, 1943.  On March 9, the Section published the diary of Seiho Suzuki, 2nd Class Petty Officer, covering the period of early 1942.  The same day the Section published the notebook and diary of Masae Suzuki, covering February 11-September 17, 1942.  On March 13, it published, extracted from list of communications personnel, the organization of Japanese submarine forces.  The next day the Section published communications personnel roster.  The Section on March 16, it published a message written on a communication form for encoding and decoding messages.  On March 18, it published part of a copy of Naval Regulations (Edition of April 1, 1936, with revisions up to June 30, 1942) and on May 30 published the remainder of the regulations.  Also on March 18, the Section published penciled notes, regarding firing torpedoes.  On March 21, the Section published bound notes on ciphers and codes.  On March 30, the Section published the submarine’s operating log covering the period January 1-28, 1943.  The next day it published printed a chart regarding depth charges.  The Section on April 1, published a file of messages and notes dealing with the gunnery section, quartering on shore, orders, and dispatches. A printed chart regarding mechanical mines was published on April 7.

In early July 1943 the Section published a notebook, probably belonging to an officer, which appears to have been kept over a period of several years. It provided a list of ships in commission from December 1, 1939 to June 1940. Also published was a code book table, detailed information about equipment on warships, information on submarines, political commentary, information on aircraft, and numerous names of officers and positions. This translation ran 41 pages.  The published translations continued. In mid-January 1944, the Section published a Japanese publication on Results and Opinions on Items of Essential Engineering Training and Research in the 6th Fleet for the Year 1941, 7th Submarine Division.

The Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Area (ICPOA), was also involved in the exploitation of the I-1 documents. On March 16, 1943, it sent to Washington information regarding hydrographic charts, taken from the I-1, noting “these charts are very accurate reproductions of United States Navy Hydrographic Office confidential charts.”[7]  In late March and early April, ICPOA translated and published various documents from the submarine. 

All in all, the sinking of the I-1 had been a great success. The documents captured from the submarine provided a wealth of information and intelligence about the Japanese codes and the Japanese navy.” – JN-25 fact sheet, Version 1.1 September 2004 by Geoffrey Sinclair.

The Truly Reluctant Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto – Part V


A still youthful looking Admiral Yamamoto. Source unknown.

Just as Patton, Ike and Nimitz led with their hearts and souls for America, Admiral Yamamoto did the same for his country… from even before WWII started.

He had tremendous foresight and used it to modernize the Japanese fleet – both on the water and most of all, in the air.

This is not said to glorify or sympathize with the Japanese military of World War II.  It is just a statement of fact.  Admiral Yamamoto – given his duty and orders by the Japanese government and as career military – was going to do his utmost to defeat America if it came to war…

…but he knew down to the tips of his ten toes and eight fingers the Japanese Empire would end if they were to take on the Americans and Brits.

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Up to the beginning of WWII as we know it, Japan’s professional military had an unreal view of their invincibility after their lop-sided victory over an European power in the Russo-Japanese War.  While Admiral Togo did soundly defeat the Russians, the Japanese military failed to realize Togo had much better gunnery equipment and newer warships.

For the losing Russians, they had taken a knife to a gunfight.  In a way, you can say the Japanese military – especially the Imperial Army – were full of themselves after this “impressive” victory…

But not Admiral Yamamoto.

He was always a cool cookie.

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Foresaw End of Battleships and Need for Carriers/Naval Aviation Superiority

In his steady rise to the admiralty and while attending Harvard, Yamamoto had heard of (but not witnessed) the famous demonstration of General Billy Mitchell sinking an obsolete German battleship by dropping bombs from now primitive biplanes (see video).  This was in 1921. The American military scoffed at Mitchell initially but as you can see here, aerial bombardment did sink a battleship.

Up to that time, the battleship ruled the seas.

No longer.

While the successful demonstration failed to awaken the US military (1), that historic moment sparked Yamamoto’s insatiable belief that aircraft, their pilots and aircraft carriers – and NOT battleships – would be the heart of all victorious naval fleets of the future.

He was dead on.

Achieving Aerial Supremacy

In 1924, Yamamoto was a captain.  While he briefly captained the cruiser Fuji, Japan’s ascent to naval aerial supremacy started when he was assigned to the Imperial Japanese Navy Aeronautical Technology and Training Center (海軍航空技術講習所) at Kasumigaura.

Located north-east of Tokyo near a beautiful lake, Captain Yamamoto was met by disdain by the young “hot-shot” aviators, brash with  swash-buckler attitudes: long hair, a general disregard for uniform code and a lot of drinking.  (Think of the fantasy “Baa-Baa Blacksheep” TV show and Robert Conrad.)  They further looked down on this much older officer; his 5’3″ frame certainly didn’t help nor did his “battleship” experience.  Yamamoto believed to achieve his vision of aerial supremacy, it had to begin with the pilots.

Cast of TV’s “Baa-Baa Blacksheep” which fictionalized the heroic escapades of MOH Pappy Boyington’s true “Blacksheep” squadron.

Yamamoto knew he had to get them in shape in all aspects.  It took over a month with some hot-heads even resigning during the ordeal, but it began with everyone getting crew cuts; when questioned about length, he rubbed his own head and crew cut and simply said exactly like mine.  He also “urged” strict adherence to the uniform code.  His solid character was critical to success.

He knew and wanted to know how to fly.  He began taking flying lessons at 40 years of age and studied late into the night to earn his wings. (2)

In addition, he would set the example.  He would not order a pilot to do anything he would not do himself.  In tests for structural integrity, HE would fly the aging craft himself.

When there were three fatalities during a training flight, he was out in the freezing sleet and cold rain along with the recovery team for three days and did not quit until all three cadets were recovered.   During those three sad days, he stoically yet quietly showed a very solemn side of his character to those around him – remorse and compassion.  Yamamoto had won them over.

He had turned around the aviation school’s reputation and glamor of being a pilot so much that many sailors flocked to apply.  He would then handpick candidates to become aviators; that’s how strongly he felt about achieving aerial supremacy.

He had now planted the seed for a world-class aviator force.  The next step necessary to achieve his vision of aerial superiority required building a fleet of aircraft carriers and advanced aircraft for the pilots fly off them. (3)

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The Imperial Japanese Navy’s Akagi Aircraft Carrier commissioned in March 1927 (apparently colorized). Akagi is written 赤城 in Japanese which means “Red Castle”.

 

Hell With the Battleships

In January 1929, he took the captain’s chair on board the Imperial Japanese Navy’s Akagi aircraft carrier. He was thrilled but without further mention at this point, his captaincy was marred by tragedies.

But later that year came a crucial development in his career that would have a direct impact on his hopes for an offensive air arm of the Navy.  He was assigned as director to Japan’s Naval Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry.  This was a magic door opening up for him as the bureau issued decisive policies on naval assets – the critical weapons and equipment.

You see, at this point in Japan’s naval history, their leaders still viewed aircraft as defensive weapons – not offensive.  Their admirals (as well as those of other world powers at that time) saw naval guns  (i.e., the big guns used on battleships) as the primary offensive weapon.  They believed in utilization of planes only for scouting/short range reconnaissance and perhaps some pestering of enemy targets until a battleship’s big guns could be brought to bear.

This strategy was disdained by Yamamoto.  He believed an elite navy requires a totally separate arm comprised of specialized offensive aircraft – fighter planes, bombers and torpedo planes – capable of inflicting severe damage to enemy targets on land or on the sea far beyond the range of a battleship’s guns.  Yamamoto’s vision was years ahead of his counterparts including America’s and England’s. (Even as late as 1943, England still used biplanes like the Swordfish which could do nothing well.)

Fairey Swordfish taking off an English aircraft carrier in 1943. Source unknown.

This new responsibility, which Yamamoto invested all his energy and time, was welcomed by him.  His task was parallel with his goal: to build a peerless naval air force.

He immediately began a program to replace the now antiquated battleship-based strike force with a deadly carrier-based task force that King Neptune would be proud of.

One aircraft of note that Yamamoto had a hand in at the get-go was the Mitsubishi Type 96 (A5N) all-metal monoplane fighter (below).  This became the predecessor to the now famous Mitsubishi “Zero” of which he again was instrumental in bringing to existence.

The Type 96 Mitsubishi A5N(A5N) all-metal monoplane fighter. It was master of the sky over China but it still lacked retractable landing gear.

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More to follow in Part VI.

Part I can be found here.

Part II can be found here.

Part III can be found here.

Part IV can be found here.

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Footnote:

(1) Even at the time of the historic Battle of Midway, US Naval pilots were still flying the obsolete Grumman F4F Wildcat, outgunned and outmaneuvered by the more agile Mitsubishi Zero which Yamamoto championed.

(2) I may be incorrect but in all the materials I have read about WWII, it appears that Admiral Yamamoto was the only command admiral who was an aviator.

(3) Of note is that the little known Mitsubishi Type 10 carrier fighter was designed by the former English Sopwith designer Herbert Smith; Sopwith had filed for bankruptcy after WWI so Mitsubishi hired him and his team.  It was of wooden frame and fabric covering. Ironically, the world’s first carrier takeoff took place in December 1922.  William Jordon, a test pilot and part of Smith’s team, took off in a prototype Type 10 from the Japanese Navy’s first aircraft carrier, Hosho.