President Obama, man up for a change.
You took credit for the killing of Bin Laden.
Do the same here.
It is shameful.
Veterans died.
Category Archives: Military
Two Old Keys to Memorial Day
I looked at these two old keys in my hand. They belonged to Old Man Jack and the thought of Memorial Day instantly crossed my mind.
Two old keys to Memorial Day.
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A year ago, I had written a blog about Memorial Day (“It” and Memorial Day).
At times, I feel the meaning of Memorial Day has either faded or has changed.
In essence, many people living in today’s “politically correct” society have taken the sacrifices of our fallen to mean a three day weekend.
Sad…but that’s how I feel.. and it angers me.
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When I looked at those two keys, my mind raced to some of the things Old Man Jack said.
But mostly, to the things he could not say.
In the twelve years I was honored to know him, he would abruptly blurt out something once in a while when we were talking in his garage… while sitting in the blue wheelchair that belonged to his wife.
There was no story associated with these mutterings.
“Boys got killed on those stinkin’ islands…” then raise his thick, white eyebrows.
Or, “Hell, I pissed in my pants.”
Or once in a while, he would make a muffled smack with his lips then slowly shake his head left and right… and not say anything more.
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One such utterance was mentioned in “Old Man Jack’s Love”.
Upon gazing upon his beloved Corsair in front of him after over 60 years, he began weeping.
After recovering and meandering next to his plane, he simply let out, “Some of (the pilots) just didn’t come back. I could never stop thinking, ‘Did a Jap get him… or was it me?’”
He said that because as Ground Crew Chief, he was responsible for the airworthiness of the plane a young Navy or Marine pilot would take out on a mission…to shoot at the enemy…or be shot at. These planes had to be in the best fighting condition as lives depended on it. But he frequently said “they had to make do” because they never had enough spare parts… so they HAD to improvise.
One time, he said a bushing had been shot out on a plane that had to go on a mission the next morning. Old Man Jack did what he could. What he must. He soaked two pieces of coconut logs in engine oil overnight. When it came time for the pilot to take off, he clamped the oil soaked wood around the cabling and used baling wire to clamp them together as tightly as he could. The plane left on its mission – with the young pilot behind the stick…in a plane with oil soaked coconut log as a bushing.
Unbelievable.
Now perhaps you understand the depth of his utterance of, “…or was it me?”
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I will never have an answer because the question could never have been asked of him.
But I feel Old Man Jack carried tremendous guilt in his heart about something that happened on those stinkin’ islands.
Not just bad; real bad.
Deep down, my heart tugs at me that someone within Old Man Jack’s reach died that shouldn’t have… and that Old Man Jack feels personally responsible for his death… and he carried that anguish for all these years.
Torment.
Grief.
Guilt.
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As Old Man Jack said, some of the young pilots didn’t come back.
They were killed or are forever missing in action.
That is for whom Memorial Day is all about.
To remember and honor those that did not come back…and not a Memorial Day sale.
Two old keys to Memorial Day…
JFK: Who Really Killed Him?
While I do not care for the term “revisionist”, I do care about truth.
And it has always been my “feeling” that the Warren Commission Report’s conclusion on the assassination of JFK – that Lee Harvey Oswald was the lone gunman – is “flawed”.
I don’t even feel Oswald killed him.
No, I was not present during the Commission’s hearings nor was I even in Texas when JFK was murdered… but is it PRACTICABLE that Oswald, using a cheaply made Russian Italian rifle, could accurately squeeze off three rounds – and hit the President twice? Remember, he didn’t have a “dry run” before the motorcade drove by.
But this new documentary, “JFK: the Smoking Gun” was absolutely fascinating.
I watched it today on Netflix… for FREE.
Even if you were born after JFK’s assassination, watching this will give you some insight on how the Federal Government operates – to the detriment of the people it is to meant to serve. It’s politicians trying to police politicians… Or the Secret Service trying to protect itself.
Netflix link: JFK: The Smoking Gun
A trailer:
If you have military background, the ballistics analysis alone is overpowering. Definitely worth watching for that alone.
…but I believe there was a second gunman.
Whoopee. 🙂
What about you?
This is America
If your eyes don’t spring a leak, there is something amiss… like with our current administration.
It really says something when your own country can’t afford a flyover for a rare duo burial.
When America – and the Press – Was Supporting Our Troops 100%
This was from a time when the entire nation was 100% behind our troops… even our media.
March 1942… here in southern California.
She, an aspiring starlet named Marilyn Hare, was determined to kiss 10,000 soldiers in early 1942 and while doing so, boost morale… Not only for the troops facing an uncertain future but the country. At this time, the news was filled with the conquests of the Japanese military in the Pacific. The Doolittle Raid and the Battle of the Coral Sea would not happen until the following month.
Times have changed yet our young are still sent to war.
For the uplifting photo series of this kissing wonder in LIFE, please click here.
What Did FDR Know? – Part 4
As we saw in Part 3, Japan and America are now at war.
While not directly related to the question of “What did FDR know?”, it is deemed critical for readers to understand the damages suffered by the US military – and specifically its naval and air assets – on December 7, 1941. It is also important to realize the huge advantage the Japanese Imperial Navy had over the U.S. Navy. Lastly, it is important for readers to note the unbridled successes of the Japanese military at that time… and what unbelievably followed.
For the vast majority, Americans are under the belief that the US was caught flat-footed with the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. Indeed, 21 ships of the U.S. Pacific Fleet were sunk or damaged.
Of those ships damaged, all but three of the ships at Pearl Harbor were refloated and repaired (Note: Pearl Harbor at its deepest is about 50′.):
- The USS Arizona – too badly damaged to be salvaged,
- The USS Oklahoma – raised but considered too obsolete to be worth repairing, and,
- The USS Utah – also considered obsolete.
In addition, the US had 188 aircraft destroyed plus 159 were damaged; the majority were hit before they had a chance to take off.
There were a total of 2,403 American casualties, including 68 civilians. Most of the military killed were on the USS Arizona (1,177 killed). Most of the civilians killed were from improperly fused anti-aircraft shells fired by US batteries hitting in Honolulu. There were 1,178 wounded military personnel and civilians combined. (1)
Japanese naval forces sailing for the raid included four heavy aircraft carriers, two battleships, two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, 35 submarines, and 11 destroyers. Indeed, a powerful fleet projecting tremendous offensive firepower. All survived unscathed; all but 29 Japanese aircraft returned to their carriers.
In the Pacific Theater, Japanese forces were rolling over Allied forces at will with victories in Thailand, Malaya, Wake Island, Guam Island, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Singapore, Burma, Dutch Indonesia and the invasion New Guinea. The Imperial Japanese Navy dominated in the Pacific, attacking Allied bases in Australia and Ceylon; they even bombed or shelled coast of North America at will albeit with minimal effect.
But, the great sea battle of the Coral Sea and more specifically at Midway essentially put a halt to the wave of Japanese victories… barely five months after Pearl Harbor.
How could that possibly be? Wasn’t our Pacific fleet crippled?
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So… how DID the US Navy stop the Japanese advance at these critical battles at Coral Sea and Midway? After all, at the time of Pearl Harbor, the US Navy only had three aircraft carriers in the Pacific: the USS Enterprise, USS Lexington, and USS Saratoga. (The USS Hornet was still on shakedown cruise and the USS Yorktown and USS Wasp were deployed in the Atlantic.)
Of course, the heroics of our sailors and Marines played a most dominant role but you may wish to ask yourself:
- Were American aircraft and ships better than their Japanese counterparts? No, production of new classes of ships and aircraft would not arrive in the Pacific until 1943.
- Did American forces have more men, aircraft and ships? Again no, the tide of the American industrial strength would not be felt in the Pacific until 1943.
- Was it better leadership? No. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz was arguably equally matched by Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, the overall commander of Japanese forces during the battles of Coral Sea and Midway.
- Did our navy stumble upon the enemy out in the Pacific by sheer luck or happenstance?
If it wasn’t the above, how was the US Navy able to engage the Imperial Japanese Navy at Coral Sea and Midway then stop them?
It was MAGIC.
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Battle of Coral Sea, May 4 – 8, 1942
By March 13, 1942, OP-G-20 had completely broken JN-25. Until then, about 10% to 15% of a JN-25 message that was intercepted could be read. (2) However, enough could be deciphered to understand the Japanese were gearing up to attack Port Moresby in Papua, New Guinea on May 7, 1942. By taking Port Moresby, Japan could extend its reach beyond northern Australia and further south.
Upon receiving the intelligence from the deciphered JN-25 messages, Admiral Chester Nimitz decided to move a fleet into position in between Port Moresby and Australia. He issued such orders on April 17, 1942. However, he had but two carriers available for action – the USS Lexington and the USS Yorktown. This battle was definitely NOT a chance encounter; it was planned.
In fact, deciphered messages allowed the US Task Force 17 to be in position before the Japanese fleets arrived to attack. But lacking sufficient capital ships and aircraft that were inferior to the Japanese Zero, the outcome was far from certain. The sailors and Marines were largely untested as well. (The USS Hornet and USS Enterprise were unavailable due to their critical roles in the Doolittle Raid on Tokyo; it took place two days later on April 18, 1942.)
With but two carriers and support ships, the US fleet was outgunned especially considering our aircraft was obsolete. The Japanese fleet sailed with a Shoho (a carrier), several cruisers and destroyers, and a dozen transports filled with troops. A smaller invasion force would move down the Solomons, which laid on New Guinea’s eastern flank, with the target being Tulagi. To protect these two invasion fleets, the Japanese carriers Zuikaku and Shokaku would spearhead yet a third fleet to provide air protection.
While the ensuing two-day Battle of Coral Sea was considered a draw, U.S. forces inflicted enough damage on the Japanese navy to force it to withdraw. In addition, as the Japanese were unable to secure the port, their military was forced to fight in land warfare, which proved disastrous for the Japanese. Of most importance, the fruit of the battle saw the Japanese carrier Shoho sunk, with both the Zuikaku and Shokaku damaged and forced to retire. Therefore, they were made unavailable for the critical Battle of Midway, just about four weeks later.
However, we lost the USS Lexington, a major loss. And while the USS Yorktown suffered heavy damage as well, the Japanese believed her to have been sunk; instead, the USS Yorktown was made seaworthy through the extreme efforts of repair crews at Pearl Harbor. While two weeks had been estimated for repairs, the repair crews had her back on the seas in just 48 hours.
This strategic victory was made entirely possible because of secret MAGIC intercepts. The Japanese still did not believe their complex JN-25 had been broken.
Battle of Midway, June 4 – 7, 1942
Arguably, the paramount triumph from the breaking of JN-25 on March 13, 1942 was the Battle of Midway. This is one battle that my neighbor, Mr. Johnson, fought on board the USS Enterprise as a very young US Marine. From decrypting the Japanese naval messages, the U.S. naval commanders knew the general battle plans of Admiral Yamamoto – even the timetable. Yamamoto’s strategy was to have aircraft carrier task forces launch both a diversionary raid off the Aleutian Islands then lure the U.S. Navy to Midway Island. His goal was to decimate once and for all what remained of the American fleet after Pearl Harbor.
Yes, the deciphered intercepts did not state in the clear Midway was the target; the messages simply designated “AF.” While CINCPAC felt strongly it was Midway, it was Captain Joseph Rochefort of OP-20-G who wily suggested how to establish for certain what “AF” stood for.
Rochefort was Officer in Charge (OIC) of Station Hypo in Pearl Harbor, the nerve station in Hawaii for deciphering JN-25 intercepts. An expert Japanese linguist and during the most critical month of May 1942, Rochefort reviewed, analyzed, and reported on as many as 140 decrypted messages per day. These reports were directly piped to the highest-ranking fleet commanders. He brilliantly strategized for American forces on Midway to send out a radio message saying that they were running short of fresh water. Rochefort and his group waited anxiously to see if Japan would take the bait. Finally, OP-G-20 intercepted a Japanese message: AF was running short of fresh water.
Establishing Midway as the target, the U.S. Navy assembled what it could. America was still short on capital ships and better aircraft. After a 48 hour turnaround, the USS Yorktown joined the USS Enterprise and USS Hornet.
While remembering that by virtue of deciphering coded Japanese messages, the Japanese Imperial Navy had three less carriers to deploy after their losses at Coral Sea – a very critical fact. After a fierce three-day battle at Midway, U.S. naval aviators sank all four Japanese aircraft carriers in Yamamoto’s task force – the Hiryu, Soryu, Akagi and Kaga. All four participated in the assault on Pearl Harbor, effectively turning the tide in the Pacific. Yes, luck was involved during the actual battle but certainly, the courage of our young men at sea and in the air was incredible. They had proven themselves but at great cost in lives and materiel… including the USS Yorktown.
Unbelievably, the Chicago Tribune published a darned story revealing that the U.S. had known about Japanese battle plans in advance. They had, in effect, revealed that JN–25 had been broken. Inexplicably, key Japanese leaders never found out about the article. Darned media – even back then.
Assassination of Admiral Yamamoto
As school history books had once shown, the battle planner of the Pearl Harbor attack was Admiral Yamamoto. He did know of the might of the U.S. having attended Harvard University – yes, Harvard – from 1919 to 1921, studying English. He did, in fact, oppose taking on the U.S. But Yamamoto had one trait which would lead directly to his death: his intense desire to be punctual. The US counted on this.
Codebreakers intercepted then learned after deciphering messages that the admiral was scheduled to inspect a naval base on Bougainville in the Solomon Islands on April 18, 1943. The detail even included his minute by minute itinerary. Some top US officials were hesitant to use this information for fear that doing so would tip off the Japanese that their codes had been broken. Nevertheless, the decision was made to assassinate Yamamoto. That morning, eighteen P–38 fighters left their base at Guadalcanal at the other end of the Solomon chain and arrived at Bougainville precisely ten minutes before Yamamoto’s plane was making its approach. The admiral was killed in the attack, depriving Japan of its most experienced and accomplished admiral and sapping Japanese morale.
To mislead the Japanese that the fighters had arrived purely by chance, the air force flew other risky patrols to the area, both before and after the attack. It was not a “one shot in the dark” mission. It was deeply thought over and planned out – because we were able to intercept and decipher coded Japanese messages.(3) They also spread “rumors” that the information was from coast watchers.
The Japanese did not change JN–25, and for the remainder of the war, U.S. intelligence intercepted and read thousands of Japanese messages. A portion of a secret OP-20-G report, circa 1943, is below listing the number of coded Japanese messages intercepted:
Japan’s Plan
Early in 1942, Japan decided to block the Allies from setting up bases in Australia. Operation MO would send a large invasion force to Port Moresby, the capital of New Guinea. From Port Moresby, the Japanese would be able to project air power beyond the northern tip of Australia and establish bases even further south (Hearn).
The Port Moresby landing force sailed with about a dozen transports filled with troops, several cruisers and destroyers, and a half-size carrier, Shoho (Bennett, Hearn). A smaller invasion force would move down the Solomons, which lay on New Guinea’s eastern flank. The specific target in the Solomons was Tulagi, which was the colonial capital. To protect these two invasion fleets, Zuikaku and Shokaku would lead a separate covering force to create a blanket of air protection (Bennett).
The U.S. Prepares
By March 1942, the United States had cracked part of the current Japanese Naval (JN) code, JN-25. However, U.S. intelligence could intercept only about 60 percent of all Japanese transmissions and had the resources to analyze only about 40 percent of the messages it did intercept (Parshall and Tully). Even then, code breakers typically could read only 10 to 15 percent of the code groups in a message (Parshall and Tully). U.S. intelligence primarily used direction-finding equipment to learn where many Japanese ships were and where they were heading (Parshall and Tully).
Beginning on April 16, U.S. intelligence began using this spotty information to piece together an understanding of a Japanese plan to move south with carriers (Parshall and Tully). On April 17, Nimitz ordered the carrier Lexington to join Yorktown in the Coral Sea (Bennett). If Halsey had been able to move Enterprise and Hornet there too, the U.S. might have been able to destroy the Japanese fleet. But Enterprise and Hornet needed refitting after the Doolittle raid of April 18, 1942, and could not get there in time for the fight (Parshall and Tully).
– See more at: http://www.pacificaviationmuseum.org/pearl-harbor-blog/battle-of-the-coral-sea#sthash.P5voInlO.dpuf
Japan’s Plan
Early in 1942, Japan decided to block the Allies from setting up bases in Australia. Operation MO would send a large invasion force to Port Moresby, the capital of New Guinea. From Port Moresby, the Japanese would be able to project air power beyond the northern tip of Australia and establish bases even further south (Hearn).
The Port Moresby landing force sailed with about a dozen transports filled with troops, several cruisers and destroyers, and a half-size carrier, Shoho (Bennett, Hearn). A smaller invasion force would move down the Solomons, which lay on New Guinea’s eastern flank. The specific target in the Solomons was Tulagi, which was the colonial capital. To protect these two invasion fleets, Zuikaku and Shokaku would lead a separate covering force to create a blanket of air protection (Bennett).
The U.S. Prepares
By March 1942, the United States had cracked part of the current Japanese Naval (JN) code, JN-25. However, U.S. intelligence could intercept only about 60 percent of all Japanese transmissions and had the resources to analyze only about 40 percent of the messages it did intercept (Parshall and Tully). Even then, code breakers typically could read only 10 to 15 percent of the code groups in a message (Parshall and Tully). U.S. intelligence primarily used direction-finding equipment to learn where many Japanese ships were and where they were heading (Parshall and Tully).
Beginning on April 16, U.S. intelligence began using this spotty information to piece together an understanding of a Japanese plan to move south with carriers (Parshall and Tully). On April 17, Nimitz ordered the carrier Lexington to join Yorktown in the Coral Sea (Bennett). If Halsey had been able to move Enterprise and Hornet there too, the U.S. might have been able to destroy the Japanese fleet. But Enterprise and Hornet needed refitting after the Doolittle raid of April 18, 1942, and could not get there in time for the fight (Parshall and Tully).
– See more at: http://www.pacificaviationmuseum.org/pearl-harbor-blog/battle-of-the-coral-sea#sthash.P5voInlO.dpuf
Purple and D-Day
The importance of MAGIC and the breaking of the “Purple” Japanese consulate code cannot be understated. For non-historian readers, the reach and military value extends far beyond the waters of the Pacific. It extends to Europe…specifically D-Day and the shores of Normandy.
As revealed in “What Did FDR Know? – Part 2” of this blog series, the US broke the code for this cipher before the attack at Pearl Harbor. The US did their best to keep the wraps over this great intelligence triumph. However, Nazi Germany’s own intelligence had good evidence that SIS had broken Purple and informed the Japanese. Unbelievably, Japan refused to believe it. (I believe this is part of the Japanese culture – to not place importance on “water cooler” talk.) Only when Congressional hearings and investigations into who knew of the Pearl Harbor attack reveal this did the Japanese accept it. Unfortunately, is was much after war’s end.(4)
Per “What Did FDR Know? – Part 1”, Baron Hiroshi Oshima was the Japanese envoy to Berlin and used his Purple machine to communicate frequently with Tokyo. Luckily for the US, Oshima was also an Imperial Army colonel at the time of appointment and loved war strategy and armaments. He followed intimately the German conquests in Europe and their latest technologies. He sent very detailed reports to his superiors in Tokyo of what he had learned using the purple cipher machine, which the US was able to intercept and decipher immediately.
Oshima became a favorite and a confidant of Hitler. Hitler – being so full of himself and pompous – shared with Oshima the most secret and sensitive of his war plans with him. Hitler even gave Oshima a tour of the German defenses in Normandy! As per his character and routine, Oshima transmitted very detailed reports of the Nazi defenses at Normandy. This was obviously key in the preparations for D-Day, so much so the deciphered intel was immediately transmitted to General Eisenhower. Not quite what we read in our textbooks…
And while the public is led to believe the U.S. did not know if the German commanders took the bait that the D-Day invasion would take place at Pas-de-Calais, Oshima secretly gave the US confidence that the Germans had taken the deception through his messages to Tokyo. The Nazis were preparing for the landing at the wrong beaches. (Note: this is not to lessen the somberness of those killed or missing in action at Normandy. Further, this is not to lessen the importance of wartime security.) Further, with their true belief that the invasion at Normandy was a diversion, the Panzer divisions were not immediately released to engage the Allied invading forces until too late.
In recognition of this value to Japan, he was promoted in a few short years from Colonel to Lt. General. Oshima’s prolific reporting prompted US General George C. Marshall to say Oshima was, “…our main basis of information regarding Hitler’s intentions in Europe” in 1944. (5)
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Final Query for Part 4
Why did the U.S. decide to take intense preparatory military action for Coral Sea based only on partial deciphers of JN-25? As stated, OP-20-G did not break JN-25 completely until March 1942. However, OP-20-G was able to adequately decipher JN-25 messages – even one sent by Yamamoto himself – only until about one week before Pearl Harbor when a code key was changed. What could the reasons be for the U.S. not taking similar defensive or offensive action at Pearl Harbor before the actual attack commenced? Was it because of incomplete intel? Were deciphered messages not of importance to FDR… or they not reach FDR at all? Were diplomatic deciphers not important? Did top brass feel their carriers would be sunk facing tremendous attacks and therefore, the Pacific War would be lost from the get-go? Or…?
Of course, there can be as many reasons as there are people.
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NOTES:
(1) National Park Service
(2) “At the Interface” documentary based on interviews of Donald M. Showers, USN, ret.
(3) Public teaching in the past was true at the surface – that the US had intercepted a radio message “sent out in the open” by a brash young officer. Now you know it was the work of cryptanalysts working under tremendous secrecy.
(4) National Cryptologic Museum
(5) “Hitler’s Japanese Confidant” by Carl Boyd
Cee’s Fun Foto Challenge: Shadows
For “Cee’s Fun Foto Challenge: Shadows” of this week…
Loyal readers know of my love for WWII combat veteran “Old Man Jack”.
After suffering through seven decades of nightmares of war, he is now finally at peace. Hopefully, he is resting comfortably beneath these shadows cast by my two youngest kids and I:
And a shadow cast by Old Glory:
For new visitors, please feel free to click and read one story of this great American who is now all but being forgotten in our new “Common Core” history textbooks. He earned the honor to be remembered:
Cee’s Photo Challenge: Patterns
Here’s an entry in response to “Cee’s Fun Foto Challenge” entry: Patterns.
The entry way is so serene yet powerful and honors all aviators.
What Did FDR Know? – Part 3
In Part 1 of “What Did FDR Know?”, I submitted tidbits that FDR – in spite of his campaign promises of not sending American boys to war – DID secretly plan with Churchill on how to get America into war without damaging their political images. Their secret discussions were nearly made public by Tyler Kent but he was tried secretly in a British court and admonished to prison until war’s end. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, on November 29, 1941, tried to leak to a major newspaper man intelligence gathered about the Imperial Japanese Navy heading towards Pearl Harbor.
In Part 2 of “What Did FDR Know?”, some history at Pearl Harbor before December 7, 1941 was provided as well as a brief history into cryptanalysis, the Japanese JN-25 and Purple codes and how the US Army and Navy broke them before and after Pearl Harbor.
In this Part 3, I will attempt to present evidence on intelligence gathered BEFORE the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.
Part 4 will attempt to present evidence on the extent of our “listening in” on Imperial Japanese Navy battle plans post Pearl Harbor.
Part 5 will attempt to present evidence on the imprisonment of Japanese and Japanese-Americans in the “war relocation centers”, as FDR called them.
The goal is to allow you to come to your own conclusion as to “What Did FDR Know?”
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We learned that the US Navy struggled to break the JN-25 code that was changed immediately before the attack. However, OP-20-G was able to decipher coded messages immediately prior to a reasonable extent. The number of JN-25 messages intercepted between just September 1 and December 4, 1941 numbered 26,581. Of these, 2,413 were released by the (now famous) NSA in 1979. Although there were more than 1,000 just between Tokyo and the attack fleet, only 20 are reportedly in the National Archives. (So much for the IJN operating under “strict radio silence” during the voyage to Pearl Harbor.)
The Purple code also became another critical source of intelligence, especially the week before Pearl Harbor. Luckily, we had been intercepting and deciphering them since September 1939… more than two years before Pearl Harbor.
Just what was transmitted by the Japanese diplomats about Pearl Harbor and intercepted through MAGIC? What other events occurred either in relation to the intercepts or the looming signs of the attack on Pearl Harbor? Please note that in 1941, they did not have emails, fax machines, TV, FedEx or SMARTphones. However, they did have TELEphones. Remember those things?
As shown above, there were more than 26,000 in JN-25 messages alone so going into detail about what was known in total would not be appropriate for this blog. However, if I were to summarize:
- With respect to the Purple analog machines built from scratch, eight were made by the Naval Gun Factory in DC. Two each were used by OP-20-G and SIS; two were sent to the British. One was sent to Cavite in the Philippines. The last one was intended for Pearl Harbor – it was instead given to the British. It is likely true that even if Pearl had a Purple machine, it may not have been of too much value as it is reported the Japanese Consulate there did not have a deciphering machine.
- Selected MAGIC ciphers were indeed placed into locked briefcases then shown to the top ten men in power over war – including FDR, just like in the movies.
- Lt. Com. Arthur H. McCollum of Office of Naval Intelligence signed an eight point memo for FDR on how to coerce Japan into war with the US (aka “McCollum Memo”, the first page of which is shown at right). It was presented to FDR on October 7, 1940; FDR began implementing them the next day; all eight were eventually put into place.
- A Purple message was intercepted on January 30, 1941. Tokyo instructed its diplomats to recruit agents covertly to spy on Allied movements and production. Issei and Nisei were mentioned for recruiting in the message. This espionage net could be for no other reason than to supply military information to Tokyo.
Typed copy of the Purple transmission of January 30, 1941. - Per “President Roosevelt and the Coming of War 1941”, FDR actually proposed losing six cruisers and two carriers at Manila in order to get into war but was stopped by Navy Chief Stark.
- On July 10, 1941, the US Military Attache in Japan reported the Imperial Japanese Navy was conducting secret training missions at Ariake Bay involving torpedo runs at moored ships.
- After the Atlantic Conference and meeting with FDR, Prime Minister Churchill cabled his Cabinet on August 14, 1941 that FDR was intent on getting into the war.
- A high level US Navy report was submitted on March 31, 1941 clearly stating that Pearl Harbor would be targeted, even so far as stating the Japanese Navy would utilize six carriers and surprise attack at dawn. That was because Japan strategically had few options and definitely could not have the Pacific Fleet to contend with.
- A Korean agent by the name of Kilsoo Haan met with Eric Severeid of CBS that there was solid evidence that Japan would attack before Christmas. In October, Haan was able to convince US Senator Guy Gillette of these plans. Gillette alerted the State Department, Army and Navy Intelligence and FDR personally.
- A coded message of September 24, 1941, from Japanese Naval Intelligence headquarters in Tokyo to the Japanese consul general in Honolulu, was intercepted and deciphered.(1) It requested the exact locations of all US Navy ships in Pearl Harbor; it even specifically asked to know if two ships were moored alongside each other. It was a map. Such detailed information would only be required if the Japanese were planning an attack on the ships at their moorings. The Japanese had not asked for such detailed information before. However, two top US officers, Stark and Turner, prohibited informing Pearl Harbor and Kimmel of this critical intelligence.
- A JN-25 message was deciphered on November 1, 1941. It ordered the Japanese fleet practicing the attack to continue drills against anchored warships at at Ariake Bay. Words included “to ambush and completely destroy the US enemy.” References to using armor-piercing bombs and “near surface torpedoes” was also mentioned.
- A Purple message of November 5th: Tokyo notified its Washington ambassadors that November 25th was the deadline for an agreement with the U.S. (to avoid war).
- A Purple message of November 11th from Tokyo to its diplomats warned, “The situation is nearing a climax, and the time is getting short.”
- Admiral Kimmel, following established Naval doctrines concerning unstable international conditions, ordered 46 (roughly one-half) of the Pacific Fleet out to sea in late November – specifically into the North Pacific. He did not inform Washington and when FDR found out, he ordered the fleet back to port under the guise such an exercise would provoke the Japanese. Undaunted, Kimmel had Admiral “Bull” Halsey put together a carrier-focused plan to protect Pearl Harbor which was never carried out. Instead, on November 26, 1941, Admiral Stark in Washington ordered Halsey to take to sea with his carriers; their mission was to ferry fighter planes to Midway and Wake Islands. Now you know why the carriers – the main target of the Imperial Japanese Navy – were “by luck” not at Pearl on December 7th.
- A JN25 order of November 23 – “The first air attack has been set for 0330 hours on X-day.” (Tokyo time)
- Another Purple message November 16th changed the deadline to November 29th. However, it stated, “The deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that, things are automatically going to happen.”
- The Japanese fleet left Japan (Hitokappu Bay) on November 25th. Remembering we were intercepting all Japanese Naval transmissions, about one hour after the Japanese attack force left port for Hawaii, the U.S. Navy issued an order forbidding U.S. and Allied shipping to travel via the north-west Pacific. All transpacific shipping was rerouted through the South Pacific. It should be easy to figure out why. If any commercial ship accidentally stumbled on the Japanese task force, it might alert Pearl Harbor. As Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner, the Navy’s War Plans officer in 1941, stated: “We were prepared to divert traffic when we believed war was imminent. We sent the traffic down via the Torres Strait, so that the track of the Japanese task force would be clear of any traffic.”
Imperial Japanese Navy’s carrier Kaga and battleship Kirishima at Hitokappa Bay, November 23, 1941. They would set sail in a couple of days for Pearl Harbor. Kaga would be sunk at the Battle of Midway. Kirishima would be attacked and would capsize on November 15, 1942 in Ironbottom Sound. - British initially decrypted a message sent Nov. 19 setting up the “Winds” alert. The US decoded it Nov. 28. The message stated there would be an attack and that the signal would come over Radio Tokyo as a weather report – rain meaning war, east (Higashi no kaze ame) meaning the US.
- On November 25, 1941, the great Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto himself, using the cracked JN-25 code, sent this message to his fleet:
“(a) The task force, keeping its movements strictly secret and maintaining close guard against submarines and aircraft, shall advance into Hawaiian waters and upon the very opening of hostilities, shall attack the main force of the United States Fleet in Hawaii and deal it a mortal blow. The raid is planned for dawn on X-day — exact date to be given by later order. (b) Should the negotiations with the US prove successful, the task force shall hold itself in readiness forthwith to return and reassemble. (c) The task force will move out of Hitokappu Wan on the morning of 26 November and advance to the standing-by position on the afternoon of 4 December and speedily complete refueling.”
This was decoded by the British on November 25 and the Dutch on November 27. WHEN it was decoded by the US is still a national secret; however, on November 26, ONI reported the concentration of units of the Japanese fleet at an “unknown port” ready for offensive action. ONI knew the fleet had been assembled at Hittokappu Bay since November 22, 1941. -
Actual message sent to the Pacific on November 27, 1941 by Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations. Please read the alert carefully and see if Pearl Harbor is mentioned. Kimmel and Short received this alert. In reaction to #17 above, Churchill himself sent FDR a secret message likely warning him about war erupting; this was presumably in response to British intelligence decoding Yamamoto’s message. (Note: Likely due to implications even today and in spite of the enumerable messages sent between them, this is the only message that has not been released.) C.I.A. Director William Casey, who was in the OSS in 1941, wrote, “The British had sent word that a Japanese fleet was steaming east toward Hawaii.”(2) In response to Churchill’s message, FDR secretly cabled him that afternoon, “Negotiations off. Services expect action within two weeks.” Note that the only way FDR could have linked negotiations with military action, let alone have known the timing of the action, was if he had read the message to set sail. In other words, the only service action contingent on negotiations was Pearl Harbor. Regardless, can it be coincidence that on Nov 26, Washington ordered both US aircraft carriers, the USS Enterprise and the USS Lexington out of Pearl Harbor? On board were 50 fighter planes diminishing Pearl Harbor’s already inadequate fighter protection.(3)
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A Purple intercept from Emperor Hirohito himself to the Combined Fleet commander – Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto. Sent on December 6, 1941 (Tokyo time). The FBI had put in wire taps on the Japanese Embassy phone lines. The FBI listened in on an uncoded Japanese telephone conversation on November 29 in which Special Envoy Saburo Kurusu asked, ‘Tell me, what zero hour is. Otherwise, I won’t be able to carry on diplomacy.” The voice from Tokyo (later identified as K. Yamamoto) said softly, ‘Well then, I will tell you. Zero hour is December 8 (Tokyo time, ie, December 7 US time) at Pearl Harbor.” (US Navy translation 29 Nov)
- On December 1, 1941, the Japanese tanker Shiriya radioed she was “proceeding to a position 30.00 N, 154.20 E. Expect to arrive at that point on 3 December.” Key those coordinates into Google Maps yourself. This message in the National Archives destroys the myth that the attacking fleet maintained radio silence. Transmission serial numbers prove that the Striking Force sent over 663 radio messages between Nov 16 and Dec 7 or about 1 per hour. (The NSA has not released any raw intercepts because the headers would prove that the Striking Force did not maintain radio silence. On Nov 29 the Hiyei sent one message to the Commander of the 3rd fleet; on Nov 30 the Akagi sent several messages to its tankers.)(4) There are over 100 messages from the Striking Force in the National Archives.(5) Reports from Dec 5 show messages sent from the Striking Force picked up by Station Cast, P.I.
- ONI located Japanese fleet on December 1, 1941 by correlating reports from the four wireless news services and several shipping companies that they were getting strange signals west of Hawaii. Remember Johann Ranneft visiting ONI and being shown the location of the Japanese fleet north-west of Hawaii in Part 1? The Soviet Union also knew the exact location of the Japanese fleet because they asked the Japanese in advance to let one of their ships pass.
- On December 2 and 3, the passenger liner SS Lurline was en route from San Francisco to Honolulu. Its radio operator, following standard operating procedures, intercepted strong signals from the IJN fleet. The messages were so lengthy and numerous that the radio operator made out “JCS”, the call sign for the IJN HQ. The signals were plotted and showed the fleet’s location heading eastward and was north-west of Hawaii. When the USS Lurline docked in Hawaii on December 5, the radio intercept logs were immediately taken to the Office of Naval Intelligence at Kimmel’s Pacific Fleet HQs. The logs were never recorded as received nor ever seen again.
- Ralph Briggs was a qualified Japanese-speaking radio intercept operator and was working at the Navy’s signals intercept station early in the morning of December 4. Buried inside the official IJN weather broadcast was the code “Higashi no kaze ame (東の風雨)”, or “East winds, rain”. (See #18 above.) The operators had been briefed to listen for those words. Per SOP, he logged it then transmitted via a secure channel to Commander Safford, in charge of the Fleet Intelligence Office in Pearl. To substantiate this, he was given four days’ leave as a reward.(6) On December 7, he was already back stateside in his Ohio home and was noted to have said something to the effect that the Japanese must have taken a licking (because he had intercepted the coded message and mistakenly believed the Navy was ready). After the attack, both the log and related communications were “lost” as well many other documents that were in safes.
- While there were many other events and intercepted secret communications, the most famous one is the 14 part Purple transmission from Tokyo to Kurusu. It officially terminated diplomatic relations with the US, i.e., it is war. Amazingly, the first 13 parts had already been deciphered by MAGIC on December 6th. When Lieutenant Lester Schulz delivered to FDR his copy of the intercept later that day, Schulz heard FDR say to his advisor Harry Hopkins, “This means war.”
- As the story goes, Kurusu failed to type up the Japanese ultimatum in time. However, Secretary of State Cordell Hull had already read the Purple intercept decoded the day before as did FDR. In essence, Hull had to look…surprised… when Kurusu handed him the ultimatum on December 7, 1941 albeit late. But at least, he was indeed angry.
We are now at war.
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The above is by no means any-wheres near a complete accounting of the events leading up to Pearl Harbor. And yes, there will be blanks in information flows, other communications that will show things countering the above, etc. But it does show how a government can disguise the truth or create lies for whatever purpose…even if it involved the deaths of human beings.
You can imagine what is going on today. Benghazi. The complete killing of SEAL Team Six. Fast and Furious. It goes on.
But some questions may be in order to perhaps counter what you believed in or were taught until now? Perhaps you can ask yourself:
- Did FDR blind the commanders at Pearl Harbor?
- Were Kimmel and Short set up to be the fall guys by denying them very critical intelligence or lead them to believe war was not imminent?
- Was Pearl Harbor alerted to the location of the attacking Japanese fleet?
Points to ponder, indeed.
And to close this (long) story, a Hollywood movie depicted Kimmel and Short receiving a telegram of all things alerting them of the possible attack on Pearl Harbor – many hours after it was over. That is true. However, how it became a late telegram is another story all together. By all accounts, Chief of Staff George C. Marshall orchestrated a delicate ballet to delay even sending that telegram for the critical few last hours. In fact, he was difficult to nail down during the critical hours before the attack, arriving late to his office to go over the critical Ultimatum. Although known for near photographic memory, he claimed he was horseback riding but his aides testified after the war that he wasn’t. Further, his aides urged him to contact Pearl Harbor but delayed that decision by reading then re-reading the ultimatum and then asking superfluous questions about what method of communicating with Pearl would be faster, for example – several times. He chose not to use the “telephone” nor use a fast, secure Navy system but sent the warning through commercial wire, of all things. Even then, the warning language he dispatched was watered down.
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So what do you think?
What did FDR know? What do you think he did not know?
More to follow in Part 4 – key naval battles, code breaking and what really happened on the waters of the Pacific.
I hope you’ll stay tuned. Part 4 is here.
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NOTES:
(1) Coded message of September 24, 1941:
Strictly secret.
Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels along the following lines insofar as possible:
1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five subareas (We have no objections to your abbreviating as much as you like.)
Area A. Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.
Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island. (This area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.)
Area C. East Loch.
Area D. Middle Loch.
Area E. West Loch and the communication water routes.
2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you report on those at anchor (these are not so important) tied up at wharves, buoys and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels alongside the same wharf.)”
There is nothing unusual about spies watching ship movements — but reporting precise whereabouts of ships in dock has only one implication. Charles Willoughby, Douglas MacArthur’s chief of intelligence and my dad’s big boss in the US 8th Army, later wrote that the “reports were on a grid system of the inner harbor with coordinate locations of American men of war … coordinate grid is the classical method for pinpoint target designation; our battleships had suddenly become targets.” This information was never sent to Kimmel or Short.
(2) Per his book, “The Secret War Against Hitler”.
(3) There are strategic evaluations asserting that not having US fighter aircraft sortied in great number against the invading Japanese fleet was “best” in the long run. Some armchair strategists claim that if the US carriers had “gone after” Nagumo’s fleet, indeed, our two vital carriers and her invaluable pilots would have been sunk, never to be recovered. That, however, is another story.
(4) The Hewitt Report, page 474.
(5) “Day of Deceit”, page 209.
(6) There is some bickering between opposing viewpoints as to the validity of this point. After the war, Japan stated it never issued such a broadcast. Other historians doubt Briggs’ testimony as there are no documents.
Cee’s Fun Foto Challenge: Patterns
Here’s a different (and correct) “Cee’s Fun Foto Challenge” entry: Patterns.
July 4th week, The Wall.
Masako and Spam Musubi 